COSLA Summary Analysis
COSLA accepts that reform will, in part, be driven by political intuition, experience and feeling. However, it remains crucial that such political ideas are tested to ensure that any proposals will actually achieve the objectives suggested. COSLA will support reform where there is evidence that sustainable community benefits will result. An assessment of the Scottish Government’s OBC for fire and rescue services (FRS) reform suggests the complete opposite – a single service could be its ruin.
The FRS reform draft outline business case, developed and supported by Scottish Government, is depressing reading on a number of levels. The document is a bureaucrat’s dream, extending to 240 pages with further sections to be added. The focus though is quantity not quality with a range of unsubtantiated assertions and figures. There is little to provide assurance that the current excellent fire outcomes and community benefits will be maintained into the future.
In order to limit risk in any change process, a crucial element of any business case is the collation and interpretation of accurate, unchallengeable baseline information regarding the costs, performance standards, and public perception of the service to be reformed. The information presented here for the fire and rescue service in Scotland is fundamentally flawed.
Similar to the police OBC, the basis of these figures is that they were culled from previous reports written for a different purpose earlier in the reform process. Reading back over these previous reports it is clear that detailed modelling and further work is required reliably to examine the costs and benefits suggested by the figures. In other words, such limited evidence as there is in the OBC is drawn from documents which themselves said that evidence was incomplete, unreliable and based on assumption.
Reference is made to workshops held during the consultation process and stakeholder groups. However, COSLA, SOLACE and Improvement Service, among others, made a number of written representations at the time of these groups, regarding the steering of debate and interpretation of what was said, and how conclusions were minuted that bore little relation to the actual discussion. This is the reality behind many of the conclusions recorded in the report.
There seems little point picking over the detail of every page but a few points stand out.
The Government’s favouring of a single service model is well known and, if we could believe the figures that lead us to this conclusion, will deliver potential savings of anywhere between £23m and £59m.
It seems unlikely that any Government would want to take the risk of removing a function from Local Government, merging eight organisations and creating a new quango for only £23m savings, so it is likely that it is the £59m figure that will be more commonly quoted.
Unlike the CFOAS regional model, which identifies around £40m of potential savings and for which COSLA’s Community Safety Executive Group has expressed support, there will have to be major reductions in firefighter numbers to achieve anything like £59m of savings. Indeed, the OBC now talks of “safeguarding frontline outcomes”, as opposed to frontline services as it was previously always termed by the Government.
Estimates suggest this could mean up to 1,500 firefighters going.
One paragraph stands out – “For most services the provision of stations, vehicles and crews is historically based with no clear evidence base for continued allocation of resources in light of current demand and future challenges.” This clearly indicates that, contrary to all previous indications, nothing – including the frontline - is safe from potential cuts.
Surprisingly the FBU has supported the Government’s single service model and, by association, this level of cuts to the frontline, although this may change once they themselves have analysed the OBC and its implications from their point of view.
In terms of Integrated Risk Management Planning, the whole ethos of that process is that it is designed around local risks and challenges, and has the resources available to drive down those risks. In future, this will be carried out on a national basis, “meaning resources are allocated and service delivery is planned on a Scotland-wide basis through a ‘bottom up’ risk-based approach.” Time will tell how, if at all, this might impact on remote and rural communities.
There is much petty criticism of existing arrangements with no acknowledgement of the role that civil servants may have had in contributing to the very things they criticise. There is of course no reflection of the considerable criticism by those within the service of existing central functions and questions around its over-resourcing.
Conclusion
Similar to policing, this document isn’t a business case. It isn’t a proper basis upon which any politician could take a decision as important as reforming Scotland’s fire and rescue service.
Regrettably it seems that, even without this flawed document, national politicians have already made up their minds that one is the only answer. It must be hoped that, reflecting on this flawed document, they will at least seek further detailed clarification of the implications of that model.
It is absolutely crucial that we get this right and that is why the CFOAS model is a far better basis to work from, prepared as it is by professionals who understand the service and understand the considerable risks inherent in any reform – ie not just to the service itself, but to Scotland’s communities and buildings. Recent events down south make abundantly clear the need for a well resourced and organised service. It is worrying enough that restructuring might become a distraction that puts lives at risk, but unforgiveable that the future structure might institutionalise that risk.
Even if the difficulties above could be overcome and corrected, an outline business case would never form the basis for final decision making. It might confirm political intuition to the extent that further detailed work was necessary, or it might lead to the conclusion that a potential reform process was worthy of further consideration. (With this in mind, COSLA has sought further work and clarification by CFOAS of their regional model.) What it could never lead to is a final decision that affects something as important as fire and rescue and community safety for the whole of Scotland. Deciding to pursue reform with a considerable period of further detailed work on the basis of this outline business case would be bad enough given its obvious failings. Implementing change on the basis of the case so far would simply be irresponsible.